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To HAVE AND TO HOLD: THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION AND
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The study of inequality "should be concerned with power at its
extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it
becomes capillary."' A husband's violent sexual possession of his wife
against her will is such a point of power. And the law's sanctioning
of this exercise of power transforms this power into truth. Therefore,
when men say "a husband cannot rape his wife," they speak the truth.
When women accuse their husbands of rape, they lie. Because women
are perceived to be liars, they remain silent.2 The dominant discourse
of truth thus evolves from the reality of ongoing subjugation. 3
The aim of this Note is to help give women the power to speak a
different truth, to help women gain "the status of those who are
charged with saying what counts as true."4 Part of their truth is that
the marital rape exemption serves as both a manifestation of and a
vehicle for the continued subordination of women in society.5 Part I
of this Note begins with the history of the marital rape exemption
and a critique of the theories that have served to justify it. In light
of this history, Part I then examines the experience of marital rape
victims and the rape laws that regulate that experience. Part II argues
that the marital rape exemption impermissibly infringes married wom-
en's rights to privacy and unconstitutionally conditions all women's
rights to marry and to privacy. Part II then examines the limitations
of adopting a rights-based approach as part of a broader strategy for
gender equality. Finally, Part III argues that the marital rape exemp-
tion discriminates against all women in violation of the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
I. THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
A. Common Law History and Statutory Developments
The marital rape exemption originated at common law in the
seventeenth century with Lord Matthew Hale's declaration that "the
I M. FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78, 96 (C. Gordon ed. 1980).
2 Cf. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 173 (1982) (noting that "we have come more
recently to notice not only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what they say
when they speak").
3 See M. FOUCAULT, supra note I, at 78, 97; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOc'v 635,
640 (983) ("Feminism distinctively as such comprehends that what counts as truth is produced
in the interest of those with power to shape reality . . ,).
4 M. FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 109, 131 (C. Gordon ed. 1980).
5 Professor Karst has noted that the "process by which law confers legitimacy on a structure
of domination and dependency is primarily a system of symbols. For a court to add the
judiciary's own special imprimatur of legitimacy on the symbolism of women's dependency is
particularly destructive:" Karst, "A Discrimination so Trivial": A Note on Law and the Sym-
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husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she
cannot retract."6 Hale has long stood as the accepted authority on
marital rape in the United States. 7 Although this "implied consent"
theory has been the most commonly invoked justification, two other
theories - the "unities" theory and the theory of separate spheres -
have also served to justify the marital rape exemption. This Section
traces the history of the unities and separate spheres theories as they
have developed in the context of marital rape.
The unities theory derived from the feudal doctrine of coverture,
or unity of husband and wife.8 Blackstone articulated this unities
doctrine in his Commentaries: "By marriage, the husband and wife
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated [into her husband]." 9 Although the unities doctrine
posited that the husband and wife became one upon marriage, in
reality "the one [was] the husband.' 10 The unities doctrine thus served
to legitimate the propertization of women through marriage. Wives
were viewed as their husbands' chattel, deprived of all civil identity."
Because women were property, the common law treated rape not
as a violation of women, but "as a property crime of man against
man." 12 Most notably, the law protected a father's interest in his
daughter's virginity and a husband's interest in his wife's fidelity. 13
bolism of Women's Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 552 (1974) (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
6 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn ed. 1778); see
Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 307 (1977) (noting that Hale's
statement was the basis for judicial recognition of the marital rape exemption in the United
States).
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fogarty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 490 (1857) (citing Hale in
support of the exemption); Note, supra note 6, at 307 n.I3.
8 See Clancy, Equal Protection Considerations of the Spousal Sexual Assault Exclusion, 16
NEw ENG. L. REv. i, 17 (198O).
9 1 NV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
10 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
11 Before the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, a married woman was unable
to sue or be sued, enter into contracts, make wills, retain her own earnings, or manage her
own property. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 35-
38 (ig6g); cf. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175, 177 (1982) (noting that a husband had the right to chastise his
wife, restrain her freedom, and impose sexual intercourse upon her against her will).
12 S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 8 (1975); see R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE
LAw 9o (1984).
13 See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 167-68, 474 N.E.2d 567, 576 (1984) (noting that
"the purpose behind [early rape laws] was to protect the chastity of women and thus their
property value to their fathers or husbands"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2029 (I985); R. TONG,
supra note 12, at 92 ("The rapist either robs the father of his daughter's virginity before this
valuable 'commodity' reaches the matrimonial market, or he robs the husband of certitude with
1256 [VOL. 99:1255
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Rape of an unmarried woman rendered her unmarriageable because
her value to future husbands was destroyed, 14 while rape of a married
woman brought disgrace upon her husband and family. Men's ac-
quisition of women as property was thus regulated by laws on rape.
Against this background of laws prohibiting rape outside of marriage
worked a social practice encouraging rape both within and prior to
marriage. The English customs of "bride capture," whereby a man
staked his claim to a woman through rape, and "stealing an heiress,"
whereby a man kidnapped a woman into marriage, were ways for
men to acquire valuable property and social status. 15 The law on
marital rape served to complete the conceptual framework by estab-
lishing a man's sexual entitlement to a woman within the marriage
contract. The marital rape exemption thus reinforced social practice,
sanctioning female sexual subordination as a weapon in the struggle
for power among men.
Women's legal status began to change with the passage of the
Married Women's Property Acts in virtually every state during the
second half of the nineteenth century.16 Yet these reforms, although
altering the status of women in the legal and economic spheres, were
not conceived in the spirit of equal rights. Rather, the Acts reflected
the development of a "separate spheres" ideology, which gradually
displaced the unities theory as the legal justification for sexual in-
equality. 17 Under this vision of social relations, men inhabit the public
realm of politics and the marketplace and women inhabit the private
realm of the family. Women were no longer naturally inferior, but
naturally different.' 8 They were free to fulfill "the noble and benign
respect to the fatherhood of his progeny, in addition to damaging or stigmatizing his prized
possession.").
14 See Note, supra note 6, at 309 n.22; see also Comment, Rape and Battery Between
Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 7,9, 724 (1954) ("At least historically, [rape] has had great
importance in destroying the acceptability of an unmarried girl as a bride." (footnote omitted)).
Freud wrote that "[tihe demand that the girl shall bring with her into marriage with one man
no memory of sexual relations with another is after all nothing but a logical consequence of the
exclusive right of possession over a woman which is the essence of monogamy." S. FREUD,
Contributions to the Psychology of Love, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (J. Riviere trans. 1959).
15 See S. BROWNIMILLER, supra note 12, at 7, IS. At common law, a victim could save her
rapist from the death penalty through marriage. See id. at 16.
16 Mississippi passed the first Married Women's Property Act in 1839, and within fifty years
every American jurisdiction had adopted some form of the Act. See L. KANowiTz, supra note
ii, at 40-41. These Acts sought to reform the common law status of married women by
granting them the right to contract, to sue and be sued, to manage and control their own
property, to work outside the home without the permission of their husbands, and to retain the
earnings derived from their employment. See id. at 40.
17 See Williams, supra note ii, at 177-78.
Is See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (i9o8); see also Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 958 (1984) ("Assumptions about biological difference
and destiny provided the prime justification for creating a separate, inferior legal status for
women." (footnotes omitted)).
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offices of wife and mother." 19 As Justice Bradley stated in 1872, "the
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman." 20 The separate spheres ideology helped shape the notion
that any legal intrusion upon the woman's sphere constituted an ille-
gitimate public invasion of the private sphere. The private subordi-
nation of women was therefore accomplished by the absence of laws
restraining male power.2 1 In this unregulated private sphere, men
were free to oppress women. Specifically, they were free to rape their
wives.
The last ioo years have witnessed significant changes in the legal
and social status of women. The nineteenth amendment, 2 2 title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,23 and the 1971 case Reed v. Reed24
represent legal signposts on the road to full disintegration of the
separate spheres ideology. The vitality of the marital rape exemption,
however, testifies to the continuing influence of this ideology on the
formation of legal doctrine. The contemporary rationales for the mar-
ital rape exemption exhibit an underlying adherence to the notions of
female inferiority and female difference. Although legislators and
judges do not explicitly refer to women as chattel or to women's
natural role in the home, 25 the rationales for the marital rape exemp-
tion, discussed below, 2 6 betray deep, perhaps unconscious, discrimi-
natory views.
B. Current Legal Protection of Marital Rape
At least fourteen percent of married women are raped by their
husbands, 2 7 yet only ten states expressly allow prosecution of these
19 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
20 Id.
21 See Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in
THE POLITICS OF LAw 117, 122 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("Isolating women in a sphere divorced
from the legal order contributes directly to their inferior status by denying them the legal relief
that they seek to improve their situations and by sanctioning conduct of the men who control
their lives.").
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
23 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe (1982). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by any
employer of fifteen or more persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce.
24 404 U.S. 7, (1971). In Reed, the Supreme Court departed from its traditional rational
relation standard of review with respect to gender-based classifications and established the
foundation for the intermediate level of review developed in subsequent decisions. See Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982).
25 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (i98o) ("Nowhere ... is a woman
regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated
with recognition as a whole human being.").
26 See infra pp. 1268-69.
27 D. RUSSELL, RAPE: IN MARRIAGE 57 (1982). Russell's survey defined rape as forced oral,
anal, or vaginal penetration. See id. at 43.
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men under all circumstances. 28 State rape statutes thwart prosecution
for marital rape in various ways. Traditionally, rape has been defined
as nonconsensual sexual intercourse by a man with a female, not his
wife. 29 Some states explicitly incorporate a marital rape exemption
by defining rape in this manner, 30 while other states refer simply to
intercourse with a female or person and then define that term to
exclude the wife or spouse of the actor.31
In the states with marital rape exemptions, the scope of the ex-
emption depends upon the perceived stability of the underlying mar-
riage. States generally regulate the scope of the exemption through
the definition of "not married" under the statute. For example, some
states define "not married" so as to allow prosecution if the parties
were living apart at the time of the incident. 32 Other states allow
prosecution only if the parties at the time of the incident were sepa-
rated by court order 33 or were living apart and one spouse had filed
a petition for annulment, divorce, separation, or separate mainte-
nance. 34 In Alabama, Illinois, and South Dakota, a husband is sub-
28 Eight state legislatures have rejected the marital rape exemption. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.011 (Vest Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (,Vest Supp. i985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320 (i979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2c:14-5(b) (,Vest 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.355-.375 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 3252 (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1985). New York has
removed its marital rape exemption through judicial action. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 474 N.E.2d 567 (1984), cert. denied, 1o5 S. Ct. 2029 (1985). The Georgia judiciary has
held that its rape statute, which is silent on marital rape, does not implicitly incorporate the
common law exemption. See Warren v. State, 225 Ga. i51, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985).
Several states allow prosecution of husbands for charges of first or second-degree rape, but
disallow prosecution for lesser sexual offenses. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-262 (West
Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-67(b), -70(b) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. II, §§ 761-763 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.2-4 (West 1979); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Purdon Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040, -. 050, -. o6o(i)
(West Supp. 1986); IV. VA. CODE § 61-8B-6 (1984); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1977).
29 See, e.g., Act of July 26, I88I, ch. 676, § 278, 188i N.Y. Laws 67 (Vol. Ill).
30 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
31 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-6O(4) (i977).
32 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401.4, -1407(D) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-409(2) (1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 251.I.A, 252.I.A (983); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-99 (Supp. i985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2) (1985).
33 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 5io.oio(3) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.41 (West 1974
& Supp. 1985); AD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (2982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.O0.2 (Vernon
1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (i98i); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01.2 (1985); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-37-I, -2 (1982 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law Co-op. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402, -407 (1978 & Supp. 2985).
34 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-i-(b) (Burns 2985); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.373
(i985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.OI(L) (Page 2982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-6io (1982).
Four states allow prosecution if the spouses were living apart or one spouse had initiated divorce
proceedings at the time of the incident. See IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-10 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § IIII(B) (West Supp. 1985); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.OXX(C)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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ject to prosecution for rape only if a final divorce decree existed at
the time of the incident; a wife separated from her husband under
agreement or court decree has no legal recourse. 35
The exemption purports to protect the harmonious and intimate
nature of the marital relationship. 36 The detailed statutory definitions
of "not married" reflect an attempt on the part of states to limit the
exemption to marriages that conform to this ideal. Yet nearly one-
quarter of the states have recently expanded the marital rape exemp-
tion to cover unmarried cohabitators3 7 and "voluntary social compan-
ions." 38  This expansion of the exemption beyond the traditional
boundaries of legal marriage cannot be justified as serving the exemp-
tion's primary rationale - the preservation of marital privacy and
harmony. Instead, the expansion of the exemption beyond the marital
relationship reflects the deeply discriminatory vision of women inher-
ent in the theories used to justify the exemption; in particular, the
expansion reflects a modern version of Hale's theory that women who
enter into relationships with men give an implied consent to sexual
intercourse or that those who consent to intercourse once are forever
bound.
The vision that women impliedly consent to rape constitutes one
side in the legal debate over the marital rape exemption - a debate
that centers on the interpretation of a husband's unconsented-to sexual
intercourse with his wife. One interpretation, which this Note terms
the "male perspective," 39 sees marital rape as "a bedroom squabble
over whether to have sex tonight. "4° A "female perspective," on the
35 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 to -6i (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-i8(c) (Supp. 1983);
S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-22-I (1979).
36 See infra p. 1268.
37 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (i977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67(b) (1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. i, § 764(2) (i979); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 707-73o(I)(a)(i) (Supp. 1984); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.4 (I979); KY. REv. STAT. § 510.010(3) (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17A, § 252(3) (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
3103 (Purdon Supp. i985); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-I(2) (1984).
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. ii, § 764(2) (1979): HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-73o(I)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 252(3) (Supp. x985).
39 Although this Note terms these perspectives "male" and "female," the terminology is not
meant to suggest that they necessarily correspond to men and women. For a discussion of how
the law of rape in general reflects a male perspective, see Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 1986).
40 D. Finkelhor, Marital Rape: The Misunderstood Crime, Address to the New York County
Lawyer's Association (May 3, 1984) (describing the views of those who hold a male perspective
on marital rape); see Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 31, 34
(1980) (arguing in support of the marital rape exemption because "there is good sense in not
permitting every marital scuffle to become a case for the courts"); cf. Comment, Forcible and
Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62
YALE L.J. 55, 67 (1952) (stating that "a woman's need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the
unconscious desire for forceful penetration").
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other hand, interprets marital rape as involving "brutality and terror
and violence and humiliation to rival the most graphic stranger
rape."41 The female voice can be heard in the stories told by marital
rape victims 42 and in the judicial opinions that invalidate or reject
the exemption. 43 Arguments for and against the exemption assume
more subtle guises, but ultimately the positions divide at this funda-
mental point of interpretation.
The male perspective accepts the myth that marital rape has no
traumatic long-term effects. 44 The female perspective recognizes facts
to the contrary. Victims of marital rape experience a trauma similar
to that of victims of stranger rape. Rape by anybody, including a
husband, "is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integ-
rity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical
and psychic harm."45 In fact, "[m]arital rape is frequently quite vio-
lent and generally has more severe, traumatic effects on the victim
than other rape." 46 Stranger rape is a devastating one-time occur-
rence; marital rape frequently involves a series of devastating occur-
rences, often spanning years. 47 Marital rape victims often suffer from
a debilitating psychological dependency that ties them to their abusive
husbands. Frequently these wives are also battered. 48 One study
The male perspective takes the following form: "'The way I see it, Cathy and I were having
problems in our marriage for the last two years. She could have claimed "rape" any time during
that time. Half of the married men in the country are guilty of the same thing if that's rape.'"
D. RUSSELL, supra note 27, at i19 (quoting a husband convicted of marital rape).
41 D. Finkelhor, supra note 40.
42 "Our marriage really deteriorated after [I was raped by a stranger]. It was the end
of my pedestal days. He approached me sexually when I was still very injured, and I
said, 'No, please don't. Not now ... .' His reaction was, 'I have rights, and you're my
wife, and as long as you're my wife, it is my conjugal right. So don't fight me.'...
When I saw that he was determined to go ahead, I really couldn't believe it, and I
started crying. He proceeded, and when he was finished he left the room and slammed
the door."
D. RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 169 (quoting a marital rape victim).
43 See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (1984) (noting that
"[a] married woman has the same right to control her body as does an unmarried woman"),
cert. denied, 1o5 S. Ct. 2029 (1985); State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 210-1I, 426 A.2d 38, 47
(198z) (stating that New Jersey's marital rape exemption "treats [women] as the sexual property
of their husbands").
44 The Model Penal Code adheres to this myth: "The character of the voluntary association
of husband and wife ... may be thought to affect the nature of the harm involved in unwanted
intercourse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, comment 8(c), at 346 (1985).
45 Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 573 (citations omitted).
46 Id.; see D. RUSSELL, supra note 27, at i9o-2o5.
47 Thirty-one percent of the participants in a study of marital rape victims conducted by
Diane Russell had been raped once by their husbands; 37% had been raped from 2-20 times;
and 31% had been raped over 20 times. See D. RUSSELL, supra note 27, at iii.
4s See id. at 90 (noting that ten percent of married women experience both wife rape and
wife beating).
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found that fifty-two percent of the victims of marital rape suffer severe
long-term effects49 as compared to thirty-nine percent of the victims
of stranger rape.50 These statistics .reflect the fact that "[w]hen you
are raped by your husband you [have to] live with your rapist."5'
11. THE RIGHTS APPROACH
Part II focuses on a rights-based argument as a means both for
challenging the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption and for
achieving gender equality. Section A presents two arguments, both
of which perceive the marital rape exemption in terms of the violation
of women's individual rights. Subsection i argues that the marital
rape exemption impermissibly infringes the privacy rights of married
women. Subsection 2 argues that the exemption unconstitutionally
burdens the privacy rights of all women.
Section B takes a broader political perspective and argues that a
rights-based approach, although a powerful one to take in court, is
limited by its conceptual framework of individual, abstract rights.
This Section argues that because the rights approach focuses on the
rights of individual women, it fails to identify marital rape as part of
the broader problem of women's subordination.
A. Women's Right to Privacy
x. Privacy Rights of Married Women. - Although the Constitution
does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy, the Supreme Court
has established the constitutional status of this right in such cases as
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 2 Eisenstadt v. Baird,5 3 and Roe v. Wade.54
The Court has declined to locate the right to privacy in any specific
constitutional provision, but rather has held that the right inheres in
the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, the penumbra of the
Bill of Rights, and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment.55 In Eisenstadt, the Court refined the contours
of personal privacy to mean "the right of the individual . . . to be
49 See id. at 192-93. These long-term effects include increased negative feelings toward
oneself (18%) and increased negative feelings toward men (37%). See id.
50 See id. at 192.
51 D. Finkelhor, supra note 4o; see Yllo & Finkelhor, Marital Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT 154 (A. Burgess ed. 1985).
"2 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (i965) (holding that the right of privacy protects married persons'
access to contraception).
" 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right of privacy protects all persons' access to
contraception).
54 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that the right of privacy protects a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy).
55 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
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free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child. '56
The right to privacy has been held to protect bodily integrity, 57
reproductive freedom,58 and individual autonomy.59 The marital rape
exemption allows a husband to violate his wife's bodily integrity. It
allows him to impregnate her against her will in denial of her repro-
ductive freedom. And perhaps most important, the exemption extin-
guishes a married woman's autonomy in one of the most personal and
intimate of all human interactions. The state thus violates the privacy
rights of married women by allowing their husbands to rape them
without fear of prosecution. 60
State laws that interfere with the right to privacy in this way must
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 61 Very
rarely will a court deem state interests sufficiently compelling to over-
come the standard's implicit presumption of unconstitutionality. 62 The
state interests behind the marital rape exemption include respecting
marital privacy, encouraging the reconciliation of spouses, and ob-
viating the evidentiary problem of proving lack of consent in marital
rape claims. As this Note demonstrates in Part ITl, these interests
56 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
57 See Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. I6X, 16i8-i9 (1985) (holding that individual privacy
interests, including the right to bodily integrity, render compulsory surgery in search of criminal
evidence unconstitutional); cf. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No
right is held more sacred ... than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person . . ").
s5 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the decision whether to
have a child is a fundamental element of the right of privacy).
59 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (holding that the right to privacy
protects "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions").
60 The fourteenth amendment proscribes only certain state actions and has never been
extended to govern the actions of private individuals. Thus, the amendment does not proscribe
marital rape as such. But the amendment does govern state actions taken to regulate rape and
other criminal conduct. And a deliberate legislative or judicial choice to carve exceptions out
of the criminal code - such as the marital rape exemption - must also constitute state action
for purposes of fourteenth amendment analysis. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381
(r967) (holding that a state constitutional amendment securing to private property holders the
right to dispose freely of their property was sufficient state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. i, 18-19 (948) (holding that state judicial enforcement of a private, racially restrictive
covenant was sufficient state action). Professor Tribe has noted that "if the conception of liberty
is sufficiently developed to define a sphere of private autonomy free from both governmental
and private infringement, a government decision not to protect individuals from private in-
fringements will plainly be a species of unconstitutional state action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § IS-2, at II1O (1978).
61 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, i55 (i973).
62 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)
(noting that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and 'fatal' in fact")..
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fail to withstand intermediate scrutiny. 63 They therefore fall far short
of satisfying a strict standard of judicial review.
2. Privacy Rights of All Women. - A second challenge to the
marital rape exemption argues that the exemption unconstitutionally
burdens the privacy rights of all women. Specifically, the marital rape
exemption falls within the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions,"
which holds that a state may not condition the receipt of government
benefits upon the nonassertion of a constitutional right.64 Although
the Supreme Court has been most willing to recognize the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in the areas of speech and religion, 65 it
has indicated its willingness to apply the doctrine when other consti-
tutional rights, such as the right to privacy, are at stake.66 Moreover,
such an application comports with the constitutional recognition that
certain rights are fundamental and thus are beyond the reach of
governmental interference.
The marital rape exemption unconstitutionally conditions women's
receipt of government benefits in two distinct ways. First, the ex-
emption conditions the benefit of marriage upon women's forfeiture
of their rights to bodily integrity, procreative freedom, and individual
autonomy. Second, the exemption works in reverse by conditioning
the benefit of protection from rape upon women's forfeiture of their
fundamental right to marry.6 7 Thus, the exemption forces all women
to surrender either their right to marry or their right to privacy.
When a statute has been shown to condition the receipt of a
government benefit upon the surrender of a constitutional right, courts
63 See infra pp. 1268-69. The New York Court of Appeals has held that these interests fail
to withstand even minimal scrutiny. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 474 N.E.2d
567, 573 (1984) ("[Tlhere is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
nonmarital rape.") The defendant in Liberta, considered "unmarried" for purposes of the statute,
was convicted of forcibly raping and sodomizing his wife in the presence of their two-year-old
son. The defendant claimed that the state's rape statute violated the equal protection clause
because it discriminated against "unmarried" men. The New York Court of Appeals agreed,
striking down the exemption as unconstitutional. See id.
64 See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595 (i96o); see also Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-o6 (1963) (holding that the government may not condition the
receipt of unemployment compensation upon the abandonment of a religious precept).
6S See, e.g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
66 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (i98o). In Harris the Court noted that "[a] substantial
constitutional question would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits
from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitu-
tionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion." Id. at 317 n.ig. But see
The Supreme Court, z983 Term - Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 87 n.3 (1985) (arguing
that Harris reflected a movement back toward the notion that the government has the unfettered
right to attach conditions to entitlements).
67 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding that the freedom to marry is
a fundamental right under the Constitution).
1264 [VOL. 99:1255
MARITAL RAPE
apply strict scrutiny.68 As noted in Subsection i above, the rationales
for the marital rape exemption fail to withstand even intermediate
scrutiny, and thus certainly cannot survive a strict standard of judicial
review.
B. Limitations of a Rights Approach as a
Strategy for Gender Equality
A rights approach provides a powerful argument against the mar-
ital rape exemption and could render the exemption invalid. Yet a
husband's legal immunity is only part of the broader problem of
women's subordination. Because a rights approach has several im-
portant limitations that undermine its ability to confront the under-
lying issue of power distribution between men and women in our
society, it may not be the wisest legal avenue by which to challenge
the marital rape exemption.
In the sphere of sexuality, as elsewhere, a liberal view of rights-
based social relations leads to a theoretical stalemate between the
values of security and freedom. 69 In the context of marital rape, for
example, a woman's right to bodily integrity (individual security) con-
fronts a man's right to marital privacy (freedom from state intrusion).
In principle, the man's right of marital privacy is no less fundamental
than the woman's right to bodily integrity, and the rights approach
as such offers no objective, apolitical basis upon which to decide
between these competing rights. 70 Liberal theory cannot adequately
justify why one right should prevail over another, because any hier-
archy of values must derive from some source external to the neutral
liberal universe. 71 By bracketing out the political sphere, rights anal-
6s See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 388, 405 (1963).
69 See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387,
389-90 (1984). As Olsen points out, "not all exercises of freedom undermine the security of
others, but most of the exercises of freedom that people seek to restrict do threaten someone
else's security. Similarly, most efforts by the state to protect the security of one person or group
interfere with the freedom of another." Id. at 387 n.i. For example, laws regulating abortion
can be viewed as undermining the security of the fetus or the freedom of the woman; laws
regulating pornography can be viewed as undermining the security of women or the freedom of
pornographers; and laws regulating statutory rape can be viewed as undermining both the
security and the freedom of young women.
70 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205,
211-13 (i979); Olsen, supra note 69, at 387-90; Dalton, Book Review, 6 HAZv. WOMEN'S L.J.
229, 235 (1983). This theoretical stalemate surfaces in areas where a clear "consensus" as to the
resolution of conflicting rights does not exist, as in the context of abortion. "The interests of
the mother and the fetus are opposed. On which side should the State throw its weight? The
issue is volatile; and it is resolved by the moral code which an individual has." United States
v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 80 (i97I) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
71 Cf., e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) ("Inasmuch as it is the
woman who... is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between
[the wife and the husband], the balance weighs in her favor."); R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS
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ysis ignores the only true ground of decision in this context: the reality
of women's sexual subordination to men.
In addition, applying rights analysis to issues of equality between
the sexes forces women into seemingly contradictory positions, arguing
for freedom in one context, security in another. 72 For example, fem-
inists might argue for the right to sexual freedom in the context of
abortion, sodomy statutes, and statutory rape, and for the right to
sexual security in the context of marital rape, pornography, and sexual
harrassment. As between areas of the law, therefore, women are
forced to take contradictory positions. A discourse of rights transforms
the real issue of power into a liberal disagreement over "where social
controls should end and sexual freedom should begin. '73 Again, only
the reality of sexual power relations can transform the niceties of line-
drawing and the contradictory rhetoric of freedom and security into
comprehensive, meaningful principles of sexual equality.
Finally, a rights challenge to the marital rape exemption reflects
and reinforces the aggregate imbalance of power between men and
women in society because it fails to identify marital rape as the
systematic oppression of women by men. 74 A rights approach indi-
vidualizes the problem of marital rape by defining it in terms of
individual rights. It identifies the evil to be corrected as the violation
of individual rights, rather than the sexual subordination of one group
in society to another. When courts affirm a woman's individual right
to bodily security, they conjure an image of the solitary woman, safe
in her bedroom. By individualizing the problem of subordination in
this way, rights analysis fails to facilitate the creation of bonds among
women that would serve to empower them as a group.
A rights approach to the marital rape exemption is limited because
it abstracts away from the reality of power relations and conceives of
social relations in terms of individual rights. For these reasons, it
may not be the most desirable legal avenue by which to challenge the
marital rape exemption. Part ImI of this Note provides an alternative
approach - gender discrimination analysis - that conceptualizes the
marital rape exemption in terms of collective power relations.
OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) (establishing a hierarchy of rights based on neutral principles of allocative
efficiency); L. TRIBE, supra note 6o, § 11-4, at 572-75 (establishing a hierarchy based on
"fundamental" rights inherent within liberal society); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Con-
stitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973) (establishing
a hierarchy derived from conventional morality).
72 See Olsen, supra note 69, at 388-90. "The central problem of the sexuality debate is that
women are oppressed by moralistic controls society places on women's sexual expression, yet
women are also oppressed by violence and sexual aggression that society allows in the name of
sexual freedom." Id. at 388.
73 Id. at 389.
74 Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 652 ("What is wrong with rape is that it is an act of the
subordination of women to men.").
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IlI. THE GENDER DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
The marital rape exemption can be either gender-based or gender-
neutral, depending upon the language used to define rape. A rape
statute that defines rape to exclude unconsented-to intercourse with
"the wife" of the actor (a nonreform statute) is gender-based. A rape
statute that defines rape to exclude unconsented-to intercourse with
"the spouse" of the actor (a reform statute) is gender-neutral. Part m1I
argues that both gender-based and gender-neutral marital rape ex-
emptions discriminate against women in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. Section A argues that in nonreform states with gender-
based statutes, the exemption fails to withstand intermediate scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. Section B argues that in reform
states with gender-neutral statutes, the exemption masks intentional
discrimination against women, rendering it invalid under Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney.7 5
A. Nonreform States
In nonreform states, men are generally exempted from prosecution
for the rape of their wives. The gender-based wording of the exemp-
tion is important because statutes that discriminate on the basis of
gender fall subject to intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. 76 In a recent line of cases concerning pregnancy classifications,
the Supreme Court has declined to recognize statutes as gender-based
unless they distribute benefits and burdens in a purely gender-based
fashion. 77 In Geduldig v. Aiello, 78 the Court held that a statute
excluding pregnancy as a form of disability was not gender-based
because, although the non-benefitted class (pregnant persons) consisted
entirely of women, the benefitted class (nonpregnant persons) com-
prised both men and women. In contrast, however, the marital rape
exemption burdens all women 79 and benefits only men. It thus em-
braces a pure gender bias.
As noted above, a statute that classifies on the basis of gender is
subject to intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection clause.80
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the challenged statutory classifi-
7S 442 U.S. 256 (979).
76 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, io5 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985).
77 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 497 n.20 (1974).
78 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Criticizing the Court's holding that discrimination against pregnant
people is not gender-based has become a "cottage industry." Law, supra note i8, at 983 &
n.107 (citing over two dozen law review articles condemning the Geduldig Court's approach
and result).
79 See supra p. 1264 (arguing that the marital rape exemption unconstitutionally burdens all
women's right to privacy).
8o See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, o5 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (I985).
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cation be substantially related to important governmental objectives. 81
In evaluating governmental objectives, "[c]are must be taken in as-
certaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions." 82 As discussed below, the objectives behind the
marital rape exemption reflect such notions; the exemption therefore
fails to withstand intermediate scrutiny.
r. Fostering Marital Harmony and Intimacy. - The most com-
pelling modern rationale behind the marital rape exemption is foster-
ing marital harmony and intimacy by protecting the privacy of the
marital relationship. 83 This rationale, however, falsely assumes all
marriages are true to the ideal conception of the harmonious and
intimate nature of marital relations. Statistics such as those on marital
violence undermine the legitimacy of this ideal. 84 The state has no
interest in preserving a deteriorated marriage, 85 and marital rape is
one of the strongest signs of such deterioration. Rape itself disinte-
grates the marriage; a wife's criminal complaint testifies to the absence
of marital harmony and intimacy.
2. Encouraging Reconciliation of Spouses. - A second rationale
advanced for the marital rape exemption is that of encouraging the
reconciliation of the spouses. 86 This rationale, however, also falls
short under intermediate scrutiny. As one court noted, "it is the
violent act of rape and not the subsequent attempt of the wife to seek
protection through the criminal justice system which 'disrupts' a mar-
riage." 87 In reality, reconciliation in the context of marital rape is
often a stage in the cycle of psychological dependence upon a violent,
81 See Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1397-98 (1984) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982)).
82 Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725.
83 See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, I65, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (1984); cf. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (I965) (holding that the Constitution implicitly protects the right
to marital privacy).
84 See M. PAGELOW, WOMEN-BATTERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR EXPERIENCES 99 (I981)
(noting that 80.5% of all battered women are beaten by their husbands).
85 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (198o) (modifying the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony because the willingness of one spouse to testify against the other
suggests that there is "little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve");
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (,976) ("No marriage may be viewed as
harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on so important
and vital an issue [as whether to terminate a pregnancy]."); Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at I65, 474
N.E.2d at 574 (holding that the right of marital privacy "protects consensual acts, not violent
sexual assault").
86 See Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 474 N.E. at 574; see also Comment, supra note x4, at
725 ("If reconciliation between married persons is to be encouraged, it would appear best to
allow a husband to be prosecuted for rape only after absolute and final divorce.').
87 People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, I65, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (1984) (citing Weishaupt v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 397, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (1984)).
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abusive husband.8 8 This rationale accepts the view that the harmful
effects of marital rape are somehow mitigated by prior sexual acts,
that intimacy serves to soften the blow.8 9 By adhering to the notion
that prior consent nullifies the brutality of rape, this view distorts the
reality of such an experience for its victims.
3. Overcoming Evidentiary Difficulties. - A third rationale ad-
dresses the evidentiary difficulties in proving lack of consent in the
prosecution of marital rape claims. This view, rooted in a fear that
wives will threaten their husbands with fabricated rape claims to
avenge personal wrongs or to extort large property settlements upon
divorce, 9 ° reflects a profoundly discriminatory attitude towards
women. The element of consent in rape is always difficult to prove.
Yet it has never been suggested that the criminal offense of "stranger
rape" be eliminated due to the difficulties of proof posed by a consent
standard.9 1
In addition, the evidentiary rationale ignores reality. There is no
reason to believe that false charges of rape are brought more often
than false charges of any other crime. 92 In fact, women in general
and wives in particular are deterred from bringing legitimate com-
plaints of rape by the social stigma associated with such a charge.
93
Our culture claims rape as a weapon in the power struggle between
the sexes; women, socialized to feel ashamed of being raped, privatize
the experience. They often conceal the fact that they have been raped
in order to avoid a second, public victimization by friends, family,
and the judicial system.
The rationales behind the marital rape exemption thus fail to
constitute "important governmental objectives" under an intermediate
standard of judicial review. Even were a court to overlook the dis-
criminatory notions behind these rationales, the exemption is not di-
rectly and substantially related to those rationales. The state interests
88 This cycle is familiar to battered wives. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 47-
48 (1979).
89 See Comment, supra note 14, at 724 ("[In the ordinary marriage relationship] the parties
have at times been very intimate, and the possibilities of serious social, physical or mental harm
from a familiar, if unwanted, conjugal embrace are rather small.").
90 See Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at i65-66, 474 N.E.2d at 574; Estrich, supra note 39; Comment,
supra note 14, at 725.
91 Rather than decriminalize the behavior, states should inquire into the continuing viability
of the consent standard. See Estrich, supra note 39 (arguing that the purpose behind the consent
rule is not to protect female autonomy and freedom of choice, but rather to assure men the
broadest sexual access to women).
92 See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d. 152, 166, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (1984) ([I]f the possibility
of fabricated complaints were a basis for not criminalizing behavior which would otherwise be
sanctioned, virtually all crimes other than homicides would go unpunished.").
93 See J. BODE, FIGHTING BACK I-I2 (1978) (noting that rape is one of the most under-
reported of violent crimes); D. RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 303 (same).
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behind the marital rape exemption, although legitimate and important
in other contexts, utterly fail in the context of marital rape. As a
result, a gender-based marital rape exemption, as formulated in non-
reform states, fails to withstand intermediate scrutiny.
B. Reform States
In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 94 the Supreme Court an-
nounced a test for evaluating gender-neutral statutes that allegedly
discriminate on the basis of sex. 95 Feeney asks whether the facially
neutral law reflects covert discriminatory intent. 96 Although a stat-
ute's adverse impact provides an "'important starting point,"' 97 courts
must look to legislative history as the primary evidence of intent. In
reform states rape is defined to exclude the spouse of the actor, thereby
rendering the exemption facially gender-neutral. In these states, there-
fore, the Feeney test would apply to the exemption. This Section
argues that the adverse effects and legislative history of the marital
rape exemption reveal discriminatory intent, thus rendering the ex-
emption unconstitutional.
i. Adverse Impact. - Part I examined the many adverse effects
of the marital rape exemption upon married women raped by their
husbands. 98 In addition to the immediate, personal harm caused by
marital rape, women in general suffer harm in two different ways.
First, the exemption indirectly affects the entire class of women by
sanctioning sexual violence against women. By permitting marital
rape, the law helps to perpetuate a myth of the powerless, subordinate
female. The marital rape exemption serves to legitimate rape as
passion, contributing to the eroticization of violence against women
in our culture.
Second, the marital rape exemption perpetuates "archaic and ov-
erbroad" generalizations concerning the proper roles of the sexes. 99
At worst, these generalizations portray women as the property of their
husbands or as naturally bound to provide them with sexual services.
94 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
95 The Feeney Court developed its test in the course of inquiring whether Massachusetts, in
granting an absolute lifetime hiring preference to veterans, had discriminated against women in
violation of the equal protection clause. See id. at 271.
96 See id. An intent-oriented analysis had already been applied to cases involving racial
discrimination. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-45 (976).
97 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
98 See supra pp. 1261-62.
99 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1975) (upholding a statute that mandated
differential treatment for male and female naval officers, but suggesting that statutes perpetu-
ating discriminatory stereotypes would be invalid).
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At best, they help perpetuate the ideology of separate spheres. 100 The
Supreme Court in recent years has made clear that laws promoting
debilitating gender stereotypes must be subject to heightened scrutiny
because they freeze biology into social destiny.10 s The Court has
appeared most willing to recognize gender discrimination where the
law in question discouraged or prevented departure from traditional
sex roles. The marital rape exemption "freezes" women in the role of
sexual objects for their husbands' pleasure.
2. Discriminatory Legislative Intent. - The Court has held that
"purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Consti-
tution. '"'102 In Feeney, the Court stated that the existence of discrim-
inatory purpose means that the decisionmaker "selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'01 3 The
primary evidence of discriminatory purpose derives from the historical
background and legislative history of a law. Feeney requires a show-
ing that the legislature adopted the law at least in part "because of"
its adverse effects upon women.
In its recent decision in Hunter v. Underwood,10 4 the Supreme
Court noted that "[p]roving the motivation behind official action is
often a problematic undertaking."10 5 To discern the legislative motive
behind a racially neutral constitutional provision with a racially dis-
proportionate impact, 10 6 the Court in Hunter relied upon the pro-
ceedings of the constitutional convention, historical studies, and the
testimony of historians. 10 7 Unfortunately, legislative records of the
adoption of marital rape exemptions are not available; nineteenth-
century committee reports, debates, and hearings rarely exist at the
state level.' 0 8 However, judicial opinions and treatises from that
100 Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, o5 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985) ("Rather
than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between
the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of
men and women.").
101 See L. TRIBE, supra note 6o, § 16-25, at io65.
102 Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (i979) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i, i6 (I97I)).
103 Id. at 279.
104 io5 S. Ct. 1916 (1985).
105 Id. at 1920.
106 The Court found in Hunter that a state constitutional provision that disenfranchised
persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude had a racially discriminatory impact. See
id. at 1920.
107 See id. at 1920-22. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1980), the Court
did not have evidence of the legislative proceedings as a basis for establishing legislative
motivation. The Court posed the question of motivation as follows: "[The State's asserted reason
for the enactment of a] statute may be rejected, if it 'could not have been a goal of the
legislation.'" Id. at 470 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.6 (i975)).
108 See R. CARTER, LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN NEw YORK STATE I (1981).
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period confirm that the marital rape exemption was codified from the
common law on the basis of Hale's declaration that a woman gives
her irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse upon marriage. 0 9 This
implied consent theory reflects a discriminatory vision of women as
property and as naturally destined for life in the private sphere. The
discriminatory purpose underlying this theory constituted the but-for
motivation for the exemption at the time of its adoption and served
as the exemption's primary rationale well into the twentieth cen-
tury. 110
Notwithstanding the discriminatory legislative intent behind the
marital rape exemption, proponents of the exemption argue that con-
temporary rationales satisfy intermediate scrutiny. The Hunter Court,
however, held that contemporary justifications can never supersede
an listorically discriminatory purpose when that purpose constitutes
the but-for motivation."' In any case, the contemporary justifications
for the marital rape exemption, although different in form from their
nineteenth-century predecessors, continue to reflect an underlying ad-
herence to an ideology of female inferiority. 112 Modern rationales have
their roots in the notion of women as chattel and as unfit for life in
the public sphere. Preserving marital privacy, encouraging reconcili-
ation, and obviating evidentiary difficulties are modern formulae for
the same nineteenth-century potion - women's subordination. Be-
cause these rationales fail to overcome an intermediate level of judicial
review, the exemption must be held unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rights analysis and gender discrimination law can effectively be
used to broaden legal perspectives so as to incorporate women's ex-
109 See State v. Haines, 25 So. 372, 372 (La. I899) (holding that a husband was not guilty
of marital rape because "of the matrimonial consent which [the wife] has given, and which she
cannot retract"); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 163, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572 (1984) (noting
that late nineteenth-century courts adopted the marital rape exemption "usually with no rationale
or authority cited other than Hale's implied consent view"); J. BISHOP, 2 TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
LAW 828 (1892) ("[A husband] does not on account of the matrimonial consent which cannot be
retracted become guilty of rape by forcing his wife to his own embraces.").
The absence of records from the legislative proceedings need not render the inquiry into
legislative motive futile. Professor C. Edwin Baker argues that "[a]lthough the Court often uses
the language of subjective intent, its opinions can be best understood as treating objective or
contextual purpose as the key constitutional concern." Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of
Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 976-77 (1983);
see also Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283 (i979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Slince
reliable evidence of subjective intentions is seldom obtainable, resort to inference based on
objective factors is generally unavoidable.").
110 See, e.g., People v. Meli, 193 N.Y.S. 365, 366 (1922) ("[T]he husband of a woman cannot
himself be guilty of an actual rape upon his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which
she has given, and which she cannot retract.").
"I See Hunter v. Underwood, io5 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (i985).
112 See supra pp. 1268-69.
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perience. There is a danger, however, in viewing legal victories as
ends in themselves, rather than as means by which to inspire collective
social movements. Legal gains can effectively be used to destabilize
-existing inequalities of power so long as these victories are perceived
in terms of their broader political impact. In the area of gender
equality, for example, the available legal tools, most notably the four-
teenth amendment, work well to dismantle intentional, blatant forms
of discrimination. Deeper, more institutional forms of discrimination,
however, remain immune to conventional legal analysis,'1 3 leaving
unaltered the traditional imbalance of power between men and
women. 114 Although inadequate as a comprehensive strategy for sys-
temic change, these tools nevertheless can attack the points at which
power influences the daily lives of men and women. By challenging
these points of impact, of which marital rape is one, the legal system
takes a step toward equality of power between men and women.
The rights and gender discrimination approaches present alterna-
tive ways for taking that step. As a practical matter, the rights
approach offers a solid, straightforward legal argument with no digres-
sions into the meaning of gender-neutrality or legislative intent. Al-
though arguably a more tenuous legal argument, the gender discrim-
ination approach offers benefits beyond the specific context of marital
rape. By focusing upon the harm done to women as a group, and by
identifying the issue as inequality, the gender discrimination approach
forces courts to focus upon the reality of collective power relations.
Whereas rights analysis recognizes the pain that women suffer alone
in their bedrooms, gender discrimination analysis recognizes the pain
they share.
113 The Supreme Court's approach to gender discrimination under the equal protection clause
reflects the view that "natural" or "real" differences between men and women justify differential
treatment, see, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 47, (x98I) (holding a
pregnancy-based classification to be gender-neutral); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
274-75 (,979) (holding that the state's hiring preference for veterans "excludes significant num-
bers of women from preferred state jobs [not] because they are women [but] because they are
nonveterans'). See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court,
92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach to sex discrimination
under the equal protection clause simultaneously acknowledges and denies the need for significant
changes in sex roles and sex-based hierarchy).
114 Two areas where the law has failed to remedy systemic discrimination are pregnancy
disability, see, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (holding that a law excluding
pregnancy from a disability insurance system did not discriminate against women), and discrim-
ination in compensation (i.e., comparable worth), see, e.g., AFSCME v. Washington, 77o F.2d
1401, 1408 (gth Cir. 1985) (holding that the state's decision to base compensation on a market
system that systematically devalued jobs traditionally held by women was not enough to establish
liability under title VII.
1986] 1273
